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This essay has two objectives: (1) To offer a general motivation for the use of sets of
probabilities to represent states of credal probability judgment. Doubt as to which of rival
answers to a given question is true is representable by the set of potential answers that
have not ruled out as impossible. Doubt concerning probability is representable by the set
of probability distributions over potential answers that are not ruled out as impermissible
to use in delibration. (2) To defend a more speciﬁc thesis that the set of permissible
probability distributions ought to be convex.
© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Doxastic states
In Chapter 1 of his two volume Theory of Probability, de Finetti wrote:
. . . , we could say that the logic of certainty reveals to us a space in which the space of possibilities is seen in outline,
whereas the logic of the probable will ﬁll in this blank outline by considering a mass distribution upon it. (de Finetti [7,
vol. 1, 27].)
The “space of possibilities” that is “seen in outline” as structured by the “logic of certainty” is the set of propositions
consistent (according to the logic of certainty) with the information that constitutes the decision maker or inquirer X ’s
state K of certainty or full belief. According to de Finetti, this space of possibilities is seen only in outline because the
speciﬁcation of X ’s credal probability distribution over this space is left out of account. A complete representation of the
space of possibilities would include a “mass distribution” represented by a numerically determinate probability constrained
by “the logic of the probable”.
Filling in the blank outline calls for more than the speciﬁcation of a subjective probability distribution over the space of
serious possibilities. X ’s state K of full belief identiﬁes a subset of the set Ω of logically or conceptually possible potential
states of full belief whose members X judges to be seriously possible in the given situation. But K does more than this.
K represents the body of information X is committed to using as evidence that warrants X ’s subjective or credal probability
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state of credal probability judgment as a function of X ’s state of full belief. I call such a function a conﬁrmational commit-
ment C ; Ω → Π where Ω is an algebra of logically or conceptually possible potential states of full belief and Π a set of
potential credal states.
Given that inquirer X is in state of full belief K at time t and endorses conﬁrmational commitment C at that time, both
X ’s space of serious possibilities and X ’s credal state B are determined. Thus a normative theory of belief change requires
that a doxastic state should be representable by a pair 〈K ,C〉 consisting of a state of full belief K belonging to Ω and a
function C from potential states to potential credal states.
Many epistemologists think that states of full belief ought to be immune to change. They advocate the incorrigibility of
states of full belief. An ideally rational agent should restrict full belief to logical (or, if there be such, conceptual) truths.
There is reason in this madness. The set Ω of potential states of full belief or doxastic propositions is partially ordered in
a manner that satisﬁes the conditions for a Boolean algebra [25, Ch. 2]. If X is in some state of full belief K , every potential
state inconsistent with it is ruled out as seriously possible. Suppose that K entails ∼ h. If X were to deliberately replace ∼ h
with h, X would, from X ’s point of view, be deliberately replacing information free of any serious possibility of being false
with information X is certain is false. An inquirer concerned to avoid error should avoid directly and deliberately replacing
∼ h by h.
Suppose that instead of revising K by adding h, X contracts K by removing ∼ h to form K−∼h . X thereby comes to regard
both h and ∼ h to be serious possibilities after instituting the change. From X ’s point of view prior to making the change, no
falsehood is imported into X ’s state of full belief. Such contraction incurs a loss of information but avoids importing error.
From this position of suspense, X can consider whether X should expand K−∼h by adding ∼ h or by adding h or should
remain in suspense. X can consider the alternatives from this vantage point without begging questions under dispute.
Should X be justiﬁed in adding h, the net effect of the sequence of changes (K to K−∼h , K
−
∼h to [K−∼h]+h ) is an exchange of ∼ h
for h. But X has not directly justiﬁed this transformation. Each step comes with its own demand for justiﬁcation. X might
have succeeded in warranting the ﬁrst step but might have failed to justify any expansion of the contraction deciding
between ∼ h and h. In general, any sequence of expansions and contraction each step of which has a direct justiﬁcation
can be legitimated without a direct justiﬁcation of the transformation that is the composition of the transformations in the
sequence. Thus, replacement of ∼ h in K by h to form K ∗h may be warranted whenever one can justify contracting from K
to K−∼h and then can justify a change from the new standard of serious possibility K
−
∼h to [K−∼h]+h [19, p. 7], [23].
This process would be impossible if the potential states of full belief did not include opportunities for suspension of
judgment. Such opportunities are threatened by thinking of X ’s state of full belief as including information concerning X ’s
current state of full belief. Many authors seem convinced that the ideally rational agent should be committed to being
opinionated as to what the contents of X ’s state of full belief are. X should fully believe that h if and only if X fully
believes that X fully believes that h and X should not fully believe that h (should judge ∼ h to be seriously possible) if and
only if X fully believes that X does not fully believe that h. If so, one cannot move from belief that ∼ h to suspension of
judgment concerning h and ∼ h unless one replaces the judgment that h is not fully believed with the judgment that h is
fully believed. Suspension of judgment on this issue is foreclosed.
I have argued elsewhere [26, Ch. 3] that X ’s state of full belief K can be completely represented by X ’s full beliefs other
than X ’s commitments to full belief as to what X does and does not fully believe. The concern to avoid error targets ﬁrst
level beliefs and beliefs about the beliefs of others but not X ’s beliefs about X ’s own beliefs.
On this assumption, the obstacle is removed to X ’s coherently ruling out as seriously impossible any proposition incon-
sistent with X ’s current belief state while acknowledging the serious possibility that in the future X will justiﬁably change
that belief state.
Ideally rational inquirer X should be opinionated with regard to X ’s full beliefs about X ’s state of credal probability
judgment. As Savage [30] argued, there can be no “unsure” credal probabilities. To assign “higher order” credal probabilities
to credal probability distributions is rationally incoherent. This rejection of higher order credal probabilities being assigned
to credal probabilities leads to rejecting the idea that credal probability judgments themselves carry truth-values. This view
(which I follow Ramsey, de Finetti and Savage in endorsing) raises the question of whether credal probability judgments
are to be changed legitimately without begging questions. I have contended for a long time that room should be made
for a mode of suspense for credal probability judgments and that such suspense should be represented by what I call
“indeterminate” (credal) probability.
2. Changing conﬁrmational commitments
Turn to the second component of the inquirer’s doxastic state: X ’s conﬁrmational commitment.
Deﬁnition. PK (x/y) is a ﬁnitely additive and normalized conditional probability function relative to K if and only if
(i) PK (x/y) is nonnegative for every x in L and for every y consistent with K and is undeﬁned for every y inconsistent
with K ,
(ii) PK (x/y) = PK (x′/y′) if K entails the x and x′ and y and y′ are equivalent in truth value,
(iii) PK (x/y) + PK (z/y) = PK (x∨ z/y) when x∧ z is incompatible with K and y,
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(v) the multiplication theorem holds – that is, PK (x∧ z/y) = PK (x/y ∧ z)PK (z/y) for every y ∧ z consistent with K .
The set of permissible probability functions in BK should be considered conditional probability functions pK (h/e) where
h is any sentence in L and e is any sentence in L consistent with K . This goes against a widespread practice of restricting e
to sentences in L such that pK (e) > 0. p(e) = 0 is allowed as long as e is a serious possibility according to X ’s state of full
belief K .2
Deﬁnition. A credal state BK relative to K is a set BK of ﬁnitely additive, normalized, conditional probability functions
relative to K . Each member of BK is a permissible probability according to BK . ΠK is the set of all such credal states relative
to K . Π is the union of the ΠK ’s.
X ’s state of full belief K at t is not only X ’s standard at t for serious possibility or standard for drawing the distinction
between what is judged certainly true, certainly false and held in suspense (judged both possibly true and possibly false). It
is also the evidence on the basis of which X selects a potential credal state in ΠK as X ’s credal state BK relative to K .
In general, there are many distinct potential credal states in ΠK . K cannot be the evidential basis for X ’s judgments
of credal probability without a principled way of deriving X ’s credal state BK from X ’s state of full belief K . Following
the practice of many Bayesians [2,3], I assume that rational X at t is committed to a rule for deriving X ’s credal state BK
from X ’s state of full belief K . Given the set Ω of potential states of full belief (or the set of deductively closed theories in
regimented language L that represent such potential states) and a corresponding set Π of potential credal states, the rule
is representable as a function C :Ω → Π from potential states of full belief to potential credal states. I call this rule X ’s
conﬁrmational commitment at t [17,21]. Carnap’s credibility for X at t is a special case of this [4, p. 311], [5, pp. 17–19]. But
anyone (including Keynes [12], Jeffreys [11] and Kyburg [13], [14] among many others) who thinks that rational X ’s credal
state should be grounded on X ’s evidence or state of full belief tacitly presupposes that the grounding or derivation is in
accordance with a conﬁrmational commitment.
Deﬁnition. A conﬁrmational commitment is a function C from potential states of full belief in Ω to potential states of credal
probability in Π that satisﬁes at least the following constraints:
Conﬁrmational Coherence: C(K ) is a member of ΠK i.e., subset of the set of ﬁnitely additive and normalized conditional
probability functions relative to K .
Conﬁrmational Consistency: C(K ) is nonempty if and only if K is consistent.
There is one additional requirement that Bayesians impose on conﬁrmational commitments.
Deﬁnition. Let K+e (the deductive closure of K and e) be consistent. C(K+e ) is the conditionalization of C(K ) if and only if for
every pK permissible according to C(K ) there is a pK+e that is permissible according to C(K
+
e ) and conversely for every pK+e
permissible according to C(K+e ) there is a pK that is permissible according to C(K ) such that the following condition is met.
pK (x/ef ) = pK+e (x/ f ) for every f consistent with K+e .
Conﬁrmational Conditionalization: For every coherent conﬁrmational commitment C and for every consistent K and K+e ,
C(K+e ) is the conditionalization of C(K ).
Conﬁrmational conditionalization is a synchronic constraint on all conﬁrmational commitments. When X retains the same
conﬁrmational commitment during an expansion of K to K+e , the shift from X ’s initial credal state to the subsequent one
is often called conditionalization or Bayesian updating. I prefer to call it temporal credal conditionalization. The credal state no
doubt changes but according to classical Bayesian principles, the change is due to a change in the state of full belief.3
An important feature of conﬁrmational conditionalization is that whenever a conﬁrmational commitment satisﬁes this
constraint, one can fully characterize the conﬁrmational commitment C by specifying its value for the weakest potential
2 One might think that the set of full beliefs can be derived from the credal state by means of this last restriction: h is in K and, hence, fully believed if
and only if for every permissible conditional credal probability function according to BK , pK (x/ ∼ h) is not well deﬁned while pK (x/h) (= pK (x)) is. This
approach, however, does not preclude there being a sentence g in L such that pK (x/g) for some permissible credal probability functions and not for others.
We can guarantee against such an eventuality if we require that pK (x/g) is well deﬁned if and only if g is consistent. But then we fail to derive the full
beliefs from the credal state.
3 See Levi [18], [19], [21] for a discussion of these distinctions. Some serious authors reject conﬁrmational conditionalization. R.A. Fisher [9], H.E. Kyburg
[1], [13], [15], [16] and A.P. Dempster [8] are distinguished examples. Advocates of temporal credal conditionalization are not, however, in conﬂict. They
are committed to refusal to change a conﬁrmational commitment once endorsed. (R.C. Jeffrey [10]) sought to avoid an account of credal states according
to which inquirers are committed to a rule for determining credal probability judgment as a function of propositionally articulated evidence. Changes
for Jeffrey seem to be responses to ineffable evidence. I, for one, do not understand this idea. It is possible to reconstruct his formalism so that Jeffrey
update is temporal credal conditionalization in an enlarged algebra. An alternative reading keeps the algebra or language ﬁxed but thinks of Jeffrey update
as changing the inquirer’s conﬁrmational commitment in response to sensory stimulation. Space does not permit a closer examination of these ideas for
which I, at any rate, have little sympathy.
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probabilities under the ‘veil of ignorance’. Given a consistent expansion K of U K , C(U K ) determines BK in accordance with
conﬁrmational conditionalization.
Strict Bayesians require that ideally rational agents endorse conﬁrmational commitments satisfying the following require-
ment:
Conﬁrmational Uniqueness: For every consistent K in Ω,C(K ) is a singleton [2], [3].
Strict Bayesians, of course, acknowledge that deliberating ﬂesh and blood agents are often confused and lack the capacity
to identify precisely the uniquely permissible probability function that belongs in C(K ) for their state K of full belief. In
this sense, the agent X can be in doubt as to what X ’s numerically determinate credal state is. X might represent X ’s state
of full beliefs concerning X ’s credal state by a set of probability functions representing seriously possible hypotheses as to
what X ’s uniquely permissible probability is.4
Use of sets of probability functions of this sort ought to be carefully distinguished from use of such sets to represent
permissible probability functions according to a credal state. The distinction is of vital importance for those who reject
conﬁrmational uniqueness. When X is in doubt as to what X ’s credal state is, X may undertake to elicit or measure aspects
of X ’s credal state. The results of such elicitation could be an imprecise measurement of X ’s credal state whether or not
exactly one credal probability is permissible according to that credal state.
On the other hand, X may be committed to a numerically indeterminate credal state according to which more than one
conditional probability is permissible. X could (at least in principle) have no doubt about the numerical indeterminacy in
X ’s credal state. But the numerically indeterminate credal state to which X is committed is an expression of another type
of doubt – to wit, a clear headed refusal to rule out of consideration, the permissible use of several distinct conditional
probability functions in practical and theoretical deliberation.
I do not mean to deny that when seeking to elicit an agent’s credal state (whether it is the agent or someone else
doing it) the “measurement” resulting can be imprecise whether the credal state is determinate or indeterminate. I insist,
however, that there is an important difference (that has ramiﬁcations for, among other things, rational decision making)
between using sets of probabilities to represent imprecise measurement of a (determinate or indeterminate) credal state
and using sets of probabilities to represent indeterminate credal states.5
The primary purpose of permissible credal probability functions is to provide a ﬁne-grained discrimination between
hypotheses that are seriously possible according to K . This discrimination becomes important when the role of probability
judgment in decision making is considered. It is, of course, useful to extend the permissible pK ’s so that members of K
are assigned pK -value 1 and sentences incompatible with K are assigned pK -value 0 as is implicit in the requirement of
conﬁrmational coherence. Counter to what many writers seem to think, however, one cannot deﬁne full belief or certainty
that h as judging the (credal or subjective) probability that h to be 1 and judging that h is impossible as judging the
probability that h to be 0. Permissible probability functions can coherently assign probability 1 to sentences that are not
entailed by K and whose negations are not entailed by K . Such sentences are not judged certainly true (false) although they
are often misleadingly judged “almost certain” or “practically certain”.6
Given a conﬁrmational commitment C , not only is the representation of the credal state BK by a state of full belief
uniquely determined but conversely the state of full belief is uniquely determined by the credal state. If a privileged standard
conﬁrmational commitment can be identiﬁed to which all rational inquirers ought to subscribe, then the claim of the
4 Savage [30] has argued convincingly that rational agents cannot be “unsure” of their own (strict Bayesian) credal state. I agree that a rational agent X
should be committed to being certain as to what his or her credal state is. But just as failure of logical omniscience is typically a failure to fulﬁll one’s
commitment to full belief, so too failure to be certain as to what one’s credal state is a performance failure. And just as X might offer locally cogent
arguments in efforts to repair a failure of logical omniscience, so too X might rely on higher order credal probabilities to extricate him or herself from a
failure to fulﬁll X ’s commitments. I wish to insist, however, that these performance failures are failures that we ought to seek to remedy insofar as we
are able. Mitigating the failure by appealing to alternative standards of rationality is a form of dumbing down the standards of rationality that we should
regard as unacceptable.
5 Peter Walley [35] has used “imprecise” probability to cover both what I call imprecision and what I call indeterminacy. Imprecise probability in my
sense is imprecise probability under a “Sensitivity analysis interpretation” in Walley’s sense when ideal beliefs are perfectly determinate but assessment is
“incomplete” (p. 106). “Direct behavioral interpretations” of lower prevision (which Walley takes to be primitive) are special cases of indeterminate proba-
bility in my sense. (p. 107). In my view, the minimal requirement for rational choice is E-admissibility that may then be supplemented by additional choice
criteria. E-admissibility explicitly appeals to sets of permissible credal probabilities and permissible utilities for consequences and derives permissible ex-
pectation functions via a cross product rule. In my judgment the sets of permissible credal probabilities are indispensable for an account of rational choice
for a diversity of situations. For Walley sets of permissible credal probabilities are also imprecise probabilities. In my judgment, however, it is misleading to
group together these two interpretations of probability just because both can be represented by sets of probability functions. Walley emphasizes the differ-
ences as I would. But he insists on holding that they are both interpretations that qualify as imprecise probabilities. I continue to follow the terminological
practice I adopted in Levi [19] and retained in Levi [21] and elsewhere.
6 This terminology is misleading. Assigning credal probability 0 to all real values of a parameter ranging between 0 and 1 is not judging each of these
values almost certainly false in any ordinary sense of “almost”. The inquirer in such a case is in complete suspense as to which of the parameter values is
the true one. There is a question as to which estimate of the parameter value to choose as the correct one (where an estimate may be a point estimate
but also may be a judgment that the true value belongs to some subset of the total range of parameter values). In many contexts, an estimate may be
recommended at t prior to expansion that contains a point x carrying 0 probability relative not only prior to endorsing the estimate but afterwards.
x counts as a serious possibility at t prior to expansion and remains so at t′ subsequent to expansion. The point estimate is not judged either at t or at t′
“almost certainly false” in any useful sense.
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all sought a probability logic that could identify a conﬁrmational commitment to which all rational agents could subscribe.
Jeffreys and Carnap hoped for a numerically determinate conﬁrmational commitment even though they conceded that they
had not succeeded in realizing that hope. All these authors understood the standard conﬁrmational commitment they were
seeking to be secured by principles of a probability logic of some kind that would be incorrigible in the sense that these
principles would be immune to revision.
If this “necessarian” dream could have been realized,7 one method seeking to reduce full belief to probability would have
succeeded. In addition, the multiplicity of credal states from which a state of full belief seems to be derivable would have
been reduced to one. If the credal state were numerically determinate to boot, the ambitions of probabilism would have
been met.
Advocates of a Personalist or Subjective interpretation of probability (for example, de Finetti and Savage8) have tended
to ignore the demand that credal states should be derivable from evidence or states of full belief in accordance with conﬁr-
mational commitments. They have rested content with demanding that credal states satisfy certain minimal requirements
of probabilistic coherence imposed by probability logic.
The Personalists are right to reject the Necessarian doctrine that the principles of probability logic are suﬃciently
powerful to mandate a standard logically sanctioned conﬁrmational commitment obligatory for all rational agents. Both
Personalists and Necessarians, however, refuse to take seriously the idea that rational agents should have conﬁrmational
commitments that are corrigible and, hence, sometimes subject to critical review. If conﬁrmational commitments cannot be
mandated by probability logic but only permitted, so personalists and necessarians both maintain, all that can be asked of
credal states is that they satisfy the requirements of probability logic (whatever the requirements of a ‘complete’ probability
logic may be).
No principle of rationality requires that X should retain the same conﬁrmational commitment after obtaining e that X
endorsed prior to expanding K by e. Conﬁrmational commitments are corrigible in the sense that one may modify them
when there is good reason to do so. That is to say, such commitments are corrigible if the principles of probabilistic logic
or rationality do not obligate everyone to embrace a common standard conﬁrmational commitment.
Once X has endorsed a conﬁrmational commitment, X is under no obligation to justify it to X or to anyone else. X
should, however, have a good reason for changing it. In the absence of such good reasons for change, Conﬁrmational Inertia
stipulates that one should retain the same conﬁrmational commitments over changes in states of full belief or evidence
unless one has good reason for change.
The corrigibility I am suggesting to which conﬁrmational commitments are subject is analogous to the corrigibility that
applies to states of full belief. Rational agents use states of full belief as standards for serious possibility so I have said.
X is committed to ruling out as not possibly true any proposition inconsistent with X ’s full beliefs. When X fully believes
that h, X has no real and living doubt, as Peirce writes, concerning the truth of h. X is absolutely certain that h is true.
Yet, X should change X ’s mind should there be a warrant for altering X ’s standard for serious possibility. Corresponding to
conﬁrmational inertia, there is a principle of doxastic inertia that urges the retention of states of full belief unless there are
good reasons for changing them.9
7 The term is due to L.J. Savage [30]. In the past I have somewhat bowdlerized the term replacing it by “necessitarian” [21].
8 It is customary to make reference to F.P. Ramsey’s classic paper “Truth and Probability” here [29]. Ramsey’s view as expressed in his 1926 paper differs
from the views of de Finetti and Savage. He recognized at least two useful interpretations of the calculus of probability – to wit, as representing degrees
of belief subject to the requirements of a logic of consistency and a physical or statistical interpretation. De Finetti and Savage sought to dispense with
the latter “objectivist” interpretation. Ramsey offered a sketch of a “representation theorem” for degrees of belief and preference. (See, Levi [28, 469].)
But he also insisted on an “objectivist” interpretation of probability as well and sought a logic of truth that would relate subjective degrees of belief with
information about chances.
9 Following Robert Brandom [1], several authors have embraced a “default and challenge” epistemology. X may incorporate h in X ’s state of information
(these authors seem loath to call it a state of full belief) pending a challenge to provide it with support or reasons. This suggests that one should open up
one’s mind to dissent simply because one has been presented with a dissenting point of view. But the mere presence of disagreement is not a suﬃcient
warrant for opening up one’s mind. Neither doxastic inertia concerned with opening up one’s mind to alternative states of full belief nor conﬁrmational
inertia concerned with opening up one’s mind to rival conﬁrmational commitments conforms to the default and challenge model so construed. Brandom
himself agrees that one needs more then the existence of a dissenting point of view to warrant opening one’s mind. The dissenter must have a license or
entitlement for the dissent. This qualiﬁcation does not, however, convert the default and challenge model into an account of conditions under which an
inquirer is justiﬁed in changing doxastic and probabilistic commitments. Challenger Y might disagree with X and do so with an authority that is widely
acknowledged. Yet, X might not recognize Y ’s authority in the sense that X is willing to precommit to a program for routine expansion where X comes
to full belief to which Y testiﬁes. Suppose, however, that X does recognize Y ’s authority, receives Y ’s opinion which disagrees with X ’s initial opinion,
and shifts to an inconsistent set of full beliefs from which X should retreat. The challenge to X ’s view that this poses does not derive from Y ’s publicly
certiﬁed entitlement to challenge but from X ’s own precommitment to programs for routine expansion relying on Y ’s opinion. It is not Y ’s status in some
community as an expert that is pivotal; but whether X has, from X ’s point of view, good reason to take Y ’s dissent seriously. Brandom seems to think that
what Y requires in order to challenge X ’s default entitlement to assert that h is a socially sanctioned license to dissent from X ’s view. X may rationally
ignore the challenge in spite of the socially sanctioned license. In other cases, X may reconsider a full belief not because of a challenge by others but
because of conﬂict with the testimony of the senses. In yet other cases, X might contract by giving up h in order to give a hearing to a theory that
promises explanatory or other informational virtues. Thus, X might sometimes ignore a “challenge” even when it has a socially sanctioned entitlement
and may have reason to contract in the absence of a challenge. In contrast to all of this, the model I deploy is concerned not with justifying beliefs or
assertions but changes in belief where the justiﬁcation is grounded in the state of full belief (and probability judgment and values) of the inquiring agent
whose beliefs are being subject to critical scrutiny. There is no need for default justiﬁcation or any other kind of justiﬁcation of current beliefs.
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ists, Ramsey, de Finetti and Savage. The subjectivists, as noted previously, rejected the necessarian view that a standard
numerically determinate conﬁrmational commitment mandated by probability logic should be available.
Subjectivists were right about this. However, their commitment to strict Bayesian doctrine confronts them with a cruel
dilemma: Either they must embrace Conﬁrmational Tenacity that requires the inquirer X to adopt a numerically determinate
conﬁrmational commitment at the onset of X ’s career as a rational agent and to hang on to it in perpetuity or to allow for
changes from one numerically determinate and strictly Bayesian conﬁrmational commitment to another without justiﬁca-
tion. That there can be no justiﬁcation for such changes derives from the fact that when X is in state of full belief K with
strictly Bayesian conﬁrmational commitment C , the uniquely permissible credal probability pK rules out any other coherent
conditional credal probability as permissible. X is obliged to use pK in deliberation. To justify a change to another conﬁr-
mational commitment, there should be a legitimate way to modify the initial conﬁrmational commitment so that it and the
rival alternatives can be held in suspense pending adjudication. Strict Bayesianism, however, allows no room to countenance
the permissibility of rival probability functions unless one rules out the permissibility of the currently adopted probability.
If there is to be a change, the change will resemble either a revolution in the Kuhnian sense or a religious conversion. The
common denominator in such changes is that there is no room for a critical review of the alternatives from a position of
suspense.
Thus, if strictly Bayesian X and Y differ in their strictly Bayesian probability judgments, there is no point of view to
which they can justiﬁably move representing a position of suspense relative to which they can reason together regarding
the merits of the initial points of view and others to which they might turn.
All of this changes if X and Y are allowed to move to a conﬁrmational commitment that represents their shared agree-
ments. In that position, X and Y should move to a state of full belief representable by the intersection of theories KX and
KY that represent their initial states of full belief. And their consensus conﬁrmational commitment should recognize as
permissible the credal probability function countenanced as permissibly by X for that state of full belief and also the credal
probability function countenanced by Y for that state. The consensus conﬁrmational commitment should then recognize as
permissible at least two conditional credal probability functions relative to the consensus state of full belief. So the set of
rationally allowable credal states should include states where probability judgment is indeterminate.
From the consensus, X and Y can then proceed to adjudicate their differences without prejudice against one or the other
initial view point or, for that matter, other strictly Bayesian viewpoints that may now also be countenanced as permissible.
Thus, once one acknowledges the corrigibility of conﬁrmational commitments, the requirement of conﬁrmational unique-
ness should be abandoned. Moreover, it also becomes apparent that states of full belief should be allowed to vary indepen-
dently of conﬁrmational commitments.
All of this may be achieved without abandoning the Bayesian requirement of conﬁrmational conditionalization. To be
sure, the temporal principle of Bayesian updating (temporal credal conditionalization) is abandoned. That is due to aban-
donment of the incorrigibility of conﬁrmational commitments.
Finally, the dogma of probabilistic imperialism according to which states of full belief are assimilated into credal states
should be abandoned. Conﬁrmational commitments and states of full belief may coherently change independently of one
another. Conﬁrmational commitments (like states of full belief) are corrigible and conﬁrmational commitments are separable
from states of full belief.
Many authors deny both the corrigibility of conﬁrmational commitments and the separability of states of full belief and
conﬁrmational commitments. Such authors may wish to embrace some form of probabilism of the sort that assimilates full
belief or certainty into probability. However, in a debate concerning the issue, one should not beg questions by presuppos-
ing this view. Corrigibility and separability should at least be entertainable. And this argues for beginning with a formal
framework that allows for corrigible conﬁrmational commitments to be considered.
We are now in a position to offer a ﬁrst answer to the question “Why Indeterminacy in Probability judgment?”
The need to allow for indeterminacy in rational credal probability judgment is a consequence of the corrigibility and
separability of conﬁrmational commitments. The principles constraining rational conﬁrmational commitments should not
forbid the adoption of conﬁrmational commitments that take as values credal states representable by sets of conditional
probability functions that contain more than one element. Otherwise the only way conﬁrmational commitments can change
is through conversion or revolution.
3. Credal probability and statistical probability
Sets of probability functions have been deployed to represent both imprecise measurement of credal states as well
as commitment to indeterminate credal states. There is a third use of sets of probability functions which may be more
widespread than the other two.
In quantum mechanics, statistical mechanics, genetics, and the social sciences, the classical calculus of probability is
often applied in the formulation of truth-value bearing hypotheses concerning the behavior of systems of various kinds in
response to tests, trials or stimuli of various sorts. It is taken for granted as part of the background information (belonging to
the inquirer’s state of full belief) that systems of some kind invariably respond to some type of trial by responding in exactly
one of several ways belonging to a set Ω of possible outcomes (or points in a “sample space”). A ﬁeld J of subsets from
the powerset of Ω (including Ω and ∅ and the unit sets for the points) constitute a set of “events” all of which describe
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probability of an event of some type occurring on a trial of the kind that has been speciﬁed. As examples, consider the
chance of obtaining heads (tails) on a toss of coin a or the chance of obtaining r heads in n tosses of coin a.
The chances mentioned here are intended to describe a property of the system to which the trial is applied. There is a
large literature concerning how to interpret these chances. It cannot be surveyed here. For my part, I am inclined to take
chances to be like theoretical terms that are not completely interpretable in terms of test behavior (such as frequencies of
outcomes on repeated tosses of a coin). Instead, principles of direct inference (or statistical syllogism) are invoked to specify
credal probabilities for hypotheses about the outcomes of experiments that are known to have been implemented given
information about the statistical probabilities. These principles of direct inference may be accorded a relatively incorrigible
status like principles of probability logic.10
The important point relevant to this discussion is that hypotheses about statistical probabilities are truth-value bearing.
Such hypotheses may be incorporated in states of full belief or they may be considered serious possibilities. As such, credal
probabilities may coherently be assigned to them.
When discussing ignorance or uncertainty about statistical probabilities, there is a widespread practice of representing
such ignorance by sets of such statistical probability distributions. Each of the hypotheses is judged to be a seriously possible
probability.
Such sets of possibly true probability distributions should not be confused with sets of permissible probability distri-
butions representing credal states. Unlike judgments of statistical probability, judgments of credal probability lack truth –
value. The important ramiﬁcation of this difference is that whereas X may coherently evaluate seriously possible hypotheses
about statistical probability with respect to credal probability, it is incoherent to judge permissible credal probability distri-
butions with respect to credal probability. The incoherence of such “higher order” credal probabilities of credal probabilities
was argued convincingly by L.J. Savage a long time ago.11
4. Conﬁrmational convexity
A set of distributions representing possibly true statistical hypotheses may or may not be convex.12 Such a set of seriously
possible statistical hypotheses is often representable by a set of distributions characterized by an (n-dimensional) parameter.
For example, the challenge might be to identify the percentage of black balls in an urn containing 100 balls. In that
setting, the chance of obtaining a black ball from the urn on a random selection of a single ball is equal to the percentage
of black balls in the urn.13 The inquirer in suspense can represent the state of ignorance by indicating the 101 seriously
possible hypotheses about the chance. This set is clearly not convex although the set of all weighted averages of this set is.
An inquirer in doubt as to which of the 101 hypotheses is true should evaluate the seriously possible alternatives with
respect to credal probability. The inquirer X could be in a numerically determinate credal state – e.g. one where assigning
each of the 101 hypotheses equal credal probability is uniquely permissible. In that case, if X knows that a ball is to be
selected at random from the urn, X should judge the credal probability of obtaining a black ball to be 0.5. X is in doubt
as to whether a black ball will be drawn or not. But there is an important respect in which X ’s view remains opinionated.
X has a determinate credal probability concerning the prospect of obtaining a black.
But if X fails to rule out all but one value for the credal probability of obtaining a black ball, X is not in suspense as
to which of a set of rival hypotheses concerning the credal probability is true. X is in doubt or suspense or ignorance in a
different sense. X is in a numerically indeterminate credal state. If this credal state is a maximally indeterminate one, the
credal probability that a black ball will be drawn is representable by the unit interval. Each value from 0 to 1 is permissible.
The set of permissible credal probability distributions over the set of 101 seriously possible statistical hypotheses is convex.
For each such distribution, direct inference and the calculus of probabilities yields a determinate real value between 0 and
1 that a black will be drawn. Each of these values is permissible.
In general, given a convex set of credal probability distributions over a set of statistical hypotheses and suitable principles
of direct inference, a convex set of credal distributions over the seriously possible outcomes of sampling is determined. This
convexity is well deﬁned for a set of conditional credal probability functions with the condition held ﬁxed. When a set
of conditional probability distributions is used to represent a set of permissible conditional credal probability distributions
10 See Levi [18], [21, Chapters 11 and 12] and [24] for more about my own views on this matter. I am inclined to abandon the requirement that chance
distributions over sample spaces must be countably additive. I did require this in Levi [21].
11 Savage [30]. Suppose X regards p1K and p
2
K to be seriously possible truth value bearing credal probability functions. If X is then entitled coherently to
assign p1K “higher order” credal probability α and p
2
K higher order credal probability 1−α, three cases are to be considered. Either α is 0, 1 or in between.
Then X ’s credal probability is αp1K + (1−α)p2K . No other credal probability is seriously possible. This contradicts the initial assumption. On the other hand,
if θ and θ ′ are two hypotheses concerning the distribution of chances over a sample space and p1K and p2K are credal distributions conditional on θ and
θ ′ respectively, the credal distributions are not held in suspense in any sense. If α is the credal probability assigned to θ and 1− α the credal probability
assigned to θ ′ , the credal probability derived by taking the weighted average coheres well and is indeed mandated by the speciﬁcations of the model. No
“higher order” credal probabilities are introduced.
12 Set T of functions over some domain is convex if and only if for every ﬁnite subset S of T , the set of weighted averages of S is also a subset of T . This
condition holds if “every ﬁnite subset S of T ” is replaced by “every pair of elements of T ”.
13 A selection of an item is a random selection if and only if the chance of selecting one item from the urn on a draw is the same as the selection of
another.
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probability functions should satisfy convexity for each proposition e that is eligible for use as the condition in a conditional
probability:
Conﬁrmational Convexity: For every e consistent with K , consider the set of conditional probability functions permissi-
ble according to C(K ). Let Ce(K ) be the set of probability functions conditional on e that are restrictions of conditional
probability functions permissible according to C(K ). Ce(K ) should be convex. If p1K (x/e) and p
2
K (x/e) are in Ce(K ), so is
αp1K (x/e) + (1− α)p2K (x/e) where 0 α  1.14
Imposing conﬁrmational convexity on conﬁrmational commitments is endorsed by some authors and rejected by others.
In my opinion, the difference between the use of sets of probability functions to represent suspension of judgment with
respect to truth-value bearing hypotheses about chances or statistical probability and representing doubt or suspense when
the suspense does not concern seriously possible truth-value bearing hypotheses but permissible credal probability functions
that are neither true nor false is reﬂected in the difference between representations of doubt where rationality does not
require convexity and representations where it does.
In the latter case assigning “higher order” credal probabilities to the permissible credal probability functions is incoher-
ent. In the former case, using sets of credal distributions over a domain of seriously possible hypotheses about unknown
chances is intelligible. In this situation, suspending judgment between rival truth value bearing hypotheses h and ∼ h pre-
cludes an intermediate alternative whereas in suspense between a pair of credal probability distributions there is room for
intermediate probability distributions.
This second point may be illustrated by considering the sort of decision theory that seems appropriate once indetermi-
nacy in credal probability judgment is acknowledged.
5. Value structures, credal states, extended value structures and E-admissibility
Let A be the set of options available to agent X as X understands X ’s predicament and let M(A) be the “mixture set”
consisting of all roulette lotteries on A. O i is the set of possible consequences of option ai in A. For each ai in A, K+ai
entails that exactly one element of O i is true and each such element is consistent with K+ai . O is the union of the O i ’s.
The extended value structure is a convex set of permissible von Neumann–Morgenstern utility functions EV (O ) over the
set of potential consequences O . The extended value structure represents an evaluation of consequences given the value
commitments of the decision maker that implies that the set O is a basic set of potential consequences.15
X ’s conﬁrmational commitment C and state of full belief K determine a credal state B . According to B , we are given a
set of permissible credal probability functions each of which assigns a credal probability distribution over O i conditional on
ai for every ai in A.
Given the extended value structure and, in addition, the credal state B determined by X ’s conﬁrmational commitment,
consider the set of permissible probability–utility pairs determined by the cross product B ⊗ EV (O ). Each pair deﬁnes an
expected-utility assignment for each available option in A (unique up to the usual positive aﬃne transformation). The set of
permissible expected utilities represents the value structure V (A) for the decision problem. The cross product rule requires
all and only expected utilities deﬁned by probability–utility pairs in B ⊗ EV (O ) to be members of the value structure.
Each permissible expected utility in the value structure determines a set of options in A that are optimal according to
that expected utility. An option is E-admissible if and only if it is optimal according to at least one permissible expected
utility. E-admissibility, so I propose, is a necessary condition for the admissibility of an option for choice in a decision
problem. According to this proposal, the value commitments of the decision maker may require appealing to secondary,
tertiary, etc. criteria for admissibility when E-admissibility fails to yield a unique recommendation. But all rational agents,
according to the proposal, are required to choose an E-admissible option [23].
6. Why should conﬁrmational convexity be satisﬁed?
Consider situations where extended value structures recognize as permissible only utility functions that are unique up
to a positive aﬃne transformation. In such cases, the decision maker’s value commitments are free from conﬂict. I wish
to argue that if this condition is satisﬁed, then if the credal state recognizes more than one conditional credal probability
function as permissible, the set of permissible credal probability functions should remain convex.
14 A simpler statement of the convexity requirement is available once one endorses conﬁrmational conditionalization. In that case, a conﬁrmational
commitment is representable by its value C(U K ) for the weakest potential state of full belief U K where all logical possibilities are serious possibilities.
Every potential state of full belief is an expansion of U K . This means that C(K ) can be derived from C(U K ) by conﬁrmational conditionalization. Hence,
we need only require convexity for C(U K ) to obtain it for all K .
15 O is a basic set of possible consequences for the decision problem if and only if every O ′ that is a reﬁnement of O into another set of possible conse-
quences is irrelevant relative to EV (O ) and EV (O ′) in the sense that any reﬁnement of oij in O into a more speciﬁc description in O ′ consistent with
K+ai is assigned equal value to oij according to every permissible value function in EV (O
′) and EV (O ) is the restriction of EV (O ′) to O . See Levi [27,
Section 3] for more discussion.
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state B ought to be convex as well.
Suppose that ev1 and ev2 are permissible expected utilities according to V (A). ev1 and ev2 are derivable from the
probability–utility pairs (p1,u) and (p2,u) respectively where u is the uniquely (up to a positive aﬃne transformation)
permissible element of EV (O ). Each of the permissible expected utilities imposes a weak ordering on the mixture set
M(A) that represents the preferences the decision maker X should have were X to face an opportunity to choose between
roulette lotteries where the prizes are the implementations of elements of A. Because X has failed to rule out either of
the probability–utility pairs as impermissible, they are both permissible. So are the two weak orderings over the mixture
set – even where they disagree. Where they disagree, the import of acknowledging permissibility is that the permissible
evaluation is a candidate resolution of the conﬂict. If a decision on policy must be taken prior to such resolution, the agent
may without irrationality choose in a manner that maximizes expected utility according to that evaluation.
Consider any weak ordering over the mixture set represented by a probability utility pair (px,u) that agrees with the
orderings induced by ev1 and ev2 where they agree with each other. Where there is disagreement between ev1 and ev2
in the assessment of elements of M(A), the evaluation of expected utility is unsettled due to the conﬂict in the credal
state. The evaluations afforded by ev1 and ev2 are by hypothesis permissible even if not obligatory. An open minded agent
should recognize as permissible any evaluation derivable from u and a px that agrees with ev1 and ev2 where they agree
even though it differs from ev1 and ev2 where they disagree. This means that the probability–utility pairs (px,u) and the
expected utilities they determine ought to be permissible in V (A).
If so, then, given that ev1 and ev2 are permissible, so are all weighted averages of these expected utilities. Hence, all
weighted averages of the credal probabilities p1 and p2 ought to be permissible in the credal state. Since this holds for
any pair of permissible expected utility functions in V (A) and any permissible probability functions in B , V (A) and B are
convex.
The convexity of the value structure V (A) obtains also in situations where the credal state B is a singleton and the
extended value structure EV (O ) contains at least two permissible utility functions. The argument parallels the one just
given and argues for the convexity of EV (O ).
Consider now situations where both the credal state B and the extended value structure EV (O ) contain more than one
element. Because credal states and extended value structures can vary independently of one another, EV (O ) can be changed
coherently to EV ∗(O ) recognizing exactly one utility function to be permissible without altering B . By the arguments we
have just developed, the credal state B should satisfy conﬁrmational convexity in that case and, hence, also when the
extended value structure is EV (O ). A similar argument shows that EV (O ) should also be convex. The crucial assumption
is that B and EV (O ) can vary independently of one another. So conﬂict in the extended value structure could be resolved
without modifying the credal state and vice versa.
7. Convexity and the cross product rule
The cross product rule requires that if (p1,u1) and (p2,u2) are permissible probability utility pairs in credal state B ,
(p1,u2) and (p2,u1) should also be permissible in B . This requirement expresses a condition on what is required to be in
suspense or in consensus. It implies that if one is open to each of the ﬁrst two probability–utility pairs, one should recognize
both p1 and p2 to be permissible in one’s credal state in the sense that the probability utility pairs formed by taking either
one of them and some permissible utility in the extended value structure ought to be permissible probability–utility pairs.
Likewise one should recognize both u1 and u2 to be permissible in the extended value structure in the sense that taking
either one of them and some permissible probability to form a probability–utility pair yields a permissible probability–utility
pair.
The value structure can then be derived from the credal state and extended value structure along the lines sketched
previously.
Kadane, Schervish and Seidenfeld [32] disagree with this. They argue that if agent X recognizes the expected utility
determined by (p1,u1) as uniquely permissible and Y recognizes the expected utility determined by (p2,u2) as uniquely
permissible and X and Y seek a “neutral” position or consensus where they suspend their disagreements concerning the
weak ordering of the mixture set of A, they should recognize probability–utility pairs to be permissible that preserve
the shared agreements in the strict preferences that (p1,u1) and (p2,u2) share in common. They then demonstrate that
only these two probability–utility pairs satisfy this condition. This contention is incompatible with recognizing (p1,u2) and
(p2,u1) to be permissible in that very same consensus.
According to Kadane, Schervish and Seidenfeld, consensus in value structure between X who recognizes (p1,u1) as
uniquely permissible and Y who recognizes (p2,u2) as uniquely permissible should differ from the consensus value struc-
ture for W who recognizes (p1,u2) as uniquely permissible and Z who recognizes (p2,u1) as uniquely permissible. And
these in turn should differ from consensus between X, Y ,W and Z . This stands in ﬂat out disagreement with the cross
product rule.
According to Kadane, Schervish and Seidenfeld, in consensus X and Y should recognize (p1,u1) and (p2,u2) as permis-
sible. But (p1,u2) and (p2,u1) should be ruled out as impermissible. This is so even though the ﬁrst pair recognizes p1 that
is permissible according to X ’s initial view and u2 that is permissible according to Y ’s initial view.
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tions of the consequences. Kadane, Schervish and Seidenfeld acknowledge that these probability and utility judgments ought
to be recognized as permissible but only insofar as they are tied to appropriate probability–utility pairs – in this instance
(p1,u1) and (p2,u2). The credal states and extended value structures of X and Y have no status in this context other than
their tie to these probability–utility pairs [31], [33].
The result is an excessively narrow view of consensus. In consensus, X and Y should be endorsing a common credal state
and, in addition, a shared extended value structure. Or so I think. The common credal state and common extended value
structure are the same as the one endorsed by W and Z . This is so regardless of whether the credal state B and extended
value structure EV (O ) are convex as I contend or are not as Kadane, Schervish and Seidenfeld allow. Yet, according to
Kadane, Schervish and Seidenfeld, the sets of probability–utility pairs are different for X and Y and W and Z . And when
we consider the consensus between X, Y ,W and Z , the same consensus credal state and extended value structure yield yet
a third set of probability–utility pairs.
Even if it is possible formalistically to provide separate representations of credal states and extended value structures by
collecting the left hand components and the right hand components of permissible probability–utility pairs, the oﬃcially
separated credal states and extended value structures do not determine the value structure uniquely. Changes in credal
states and extended value structures need not be considered when investigating changes in value structures and, hence, in
judgments as to which options are admissible for choice. The only consensus that matters for deliberation is consensus in
value structure. In this sense probability judgment and value judgment are not separable.
Kadane, Schervish and Seidenfeld reject conﬁrmational convexity, the convexity of the value structure and the cross
product rule because, as they explicitly acknowledge, they think that credal states and value structures play no role in an
account of rational choice. The permissible probability–utility pairs or the permissible expected utility functions in the value
structure determine the choice function for subsets of M(A). There is no need for a derivation of probability utility pairs
from separately speciﬁed credal states and value structures via a Cross Product Rule or some substitute for such a rule.
This view denies the possibility of exploring the question of legitimate change in credal probability judgment and change
in value judgment for consequences of options as independent factors that jointly determine the value structure. The proper
unit of analysis would be the probability–utility pair and the expected utility determined by it. According to their vision
of doubt or of shared agreement, doubt (or shared agreement) about credal probabilities in credal states and utilities in
extended value structures are no more intelligible than they are for the strict Bayesians. The only doubt that matters
concerns value structures.
I have no demonstration of the untenability of their view. Even so, I am reluctant to sacriﬁce the separability and
independent variability of belief (both full belief and credal probability) and value judgment for the sake of an account of
consensus in value structure that preserves consensus in a ‘paretian’ sense for such structure but jettisons consensus in
credal state and extended value structure.
Kadane, Schervish and Seidenfeld have uncovered something important. But the lesson about doubt and consensus that
they draw from it seems to me to be the wrong one. They have demonstrated that when a decision maker (or a group
of decision makers) recognize several credal probabilities to be permissible and several utilities to be permissible, the
convexity of the value structure V (A) must be violated. This is true if one follows them in abandoning the credal state
and its convexity and the extended value structure and its convexity for the sake of attending to consensus in the value
structure. It is also true if one embraces the point of view I favor according to which the cross product rule and convexity
of the credal state and extended value structure determine the value structure.16
Perhaps the most important feature of this dispute is that it concerns how the state of doubt in the case of an individual
agent or consensus in the case of a group of agents should be understood. The disagreement arises within a background of
shared agreement as to the importance of the idea of representing doubt or consensus with respect to expected utility by a
set of permissible expected utility functions according to a value structure. We also agree as to the importance of the thesis
that E-admissibility is necessary for the admissibility of options for choice. Our dispute concerns the question of doubt or
consensus concerning credal probability judgment and the utility of consequences and whether agents should be concerned
with revision of credal states and extended value structures.
8. Convexity, irrelevance and independence
Seidenfeld in association with his Carnegie Mellon associates, Kadane and Schervish and Fabio Cosman of the University
of Sao Paolo have recently raised another objection against the convexity condition [34].
Two physicians are interested in determining whether a patient is allergic to some substance. This interest is provoked
by the bearing of the issue on a decision between three treatments contemplated.
16 Kadane, Schervish and Seidenfeld point out that in adopting the view I favor, one can retain a conditional convexity of the value structure. The convex
hull of any pair of probability–utility pairs in V (A) that share a common utility (probability) is a subset of V (A).
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patient is not allergic (∼ A) and 0 otherwise (A). T2 pays 1 if A and 0 if ∼ A. T3 implements T1 if the weather is sunny (S)
and implements T2 otherwise. So the payoff matrix can be represented as follows:
AS A ∼ S ∼ AS ∼ A ∼ S
T1 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
T2 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
T3 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
The physicians disagree in their credal probability judgments concerning the truth-values of the four states as given in
the following table. They agree that the two states are probabilistically independent. But physician 1 judges p1(A) = 0.4
and p1(S) = 0.2. According to physician 2, p2(A) = 0.6 and p2(S) = 0.8. The following table provides the joint probability
distributions.
p1 0.08 0.32 0.12 0.48
p2 0.48 0.12 0.32 0.48
If the two physicians seek a consensus, the credal state should be the set of weighted averages of p1 and p2 according
to the account I have proposed – i.e., the convex hull. Hence, the following should be permissible from the consensus point
of view.
p3 0.28 0.22 0.22 0.28
Observe, however, that according to p3, A and S are not probabilistically independent. So there is a permissible proba-
bility in the consensus credal state that fails to preserve the shared agreement of the two physicians on this point. Kadane,
Schervish and Seidenfeld have recently made this observation the core of a second objection to conﬁrmational convexity.
Objections to conﬁrmational convexity based on this feature of convexity have a longer history than the objection pre-
viously discussed. It is well known that even when two events are probabilistically independent according to distributions
that are the extreme points of a convex set, distributions in the interior of the set will fail to secure independence of the
two events. I have considered whether this point amounts to an objection elsewhere.17
If A and S are probabilistically independent according to p1 and p2, this means that the two credal probabilities satisfy
the conditions p1(A/S) = p1(A) and p2(A/S) = p2(A). Hence if an inquirer judged either one of them as uniquely permis-
sible, expanding the inquirer’s state of full belief K by adding S would not alter the permissible credal distribution for A
and ∼ A. Consider now the convex hull of these two probabilities. It speciﬁes a set of permissible distributions for A and
∼ A. Suppose that our two physicians are employing the consensus credal state and ﬁnd out that the weather is sunny.
They continue to use the same conﬁrmational commitment and so update by temporal credal conditionalization. The new
set of permissible distributions for A and ∼ A remain the same as before. In this respect, whether S is true or not is con-
ﬁrmationally irrelevant to the truth of A. The fact that the permissible probabilities over the joint space of A and S in the
interior of the initial convex set do not satisfy probabilistic independence makes no difference to the set permissible uncon-
ditional probabilities for A and ∼ A when S is added to the inquirer’s evidence.18 Hence, there should be no difference to
the evaluation of the available options with respect to E-admissibility.
Seidenfeld, Schervish and Kadane, disagree with this last observation. They point out that neither physician would in-
dividually recognize T3 as E-admissible when facing the decision problem before knowing the truth values of either A
or S . When they confront the decision problem in consensus, requiring that the credal state be convex requires that p3
be permissible. And this secures the E-admissibility of T3 even though this disrupts the shared view of the two physicians
that it is not E-admissible – a consensus based on their common conviction that the weather has nothing to do with the
presence or absence of the allergy. To avoid this result, which Kadane, Schervish and Seidenfeld think obviously wrong, they
recommend that convexity be given up as a condition on credal states.
Let us look at how conﬁrmational irrelevance bears on the scenario just described a little more closely. The conﬁrma-
tional irrelevance of S for A implies that in comparing the decision problems facing the two physicians before ﬁnding out
whether the weather is sunny and after ﬁnding out, if the set of options remain the same, the set of E-admissible options re-
main the same. I did not think of inserting the italicized condition into my original characterization but it seems obviously
correct. Seidenfeld’s example indicates how important it is.
In the scenario with which we are presented, the set of options available to the two physicians before it is discovered
whether the day is sunny differs from the set of options available for choice after the physicians ﬁnd out what the weather
is. Before ﬁnding out, both physicians are in the dark as to whether it will be sunny (S). T3 may be added coherently to the
options T1, T2 counted as available for choice. But after ﬁnding out the truth of S , T3 is no longer an option distinct from
the other two. If T3 was chosen beforehand, it is implemented once it is settled that S is true (false) by implementing T1
(implementing T2) and no longer an option. The physicians surrender control once they ﬁnd out what the weather will be
as long as they live up to the commitment they made beforehand. This lack of control at the second stage applies just as
well if the physicians chose one of the other two options beforehand.
17 In Levi [20], [21], [22].
18 Conﬁrmational irrelevance is deﬁned in Levi [21, p. 286]. It is almost the same as epistemic irrelevance according to Deﬁnition 1 in Cozman [6, p. 105].
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out whether S is true or false. But doing that is precisely to decide not to implement T3 beforehand and to move to a
predicament where T3 is no longer an option afterwards. The physicians still have two other options T1 and T2 which are
both E-admissible whether the credal state is convex or not as long as both p1 and p2 are permissible.
In any case, whether the physicians are acting separately or in concert, were they, counter to the scenario, to have only
T1 and T2 as options, the requirements of conﬁrmational irrelevance would be easily met. Both are E-admissible. In the
case where T3 is an option before ﬁnding out the truth-value of S , the circumstance that in that case T3 is E-admissible
does not mean that the physicians are prepared to pay a fee to ﬁnd out the information about the truth value of S in order
to evaluate the available options with respect to how well they promote the goals of the decision makers. Paying the fee is
a condition for implementing the option T3. The E-admissibility of T3 shows that paying the fee is not a deterrent to the
choice of an option whose implementation requires paying that fee. This does not mean that either physician alone or in
consensus judges the condition of the weather to be information relevant to evaluating the condition of the patients with
respect to the presence of the allergy.
In the Seidenfeld, Schervish and Kadane example, choosing T3 uses the weather at the moment of implementation as
input rather than as evidence. T3 could be implemented by letting an assistant or some automated process implement the
selection of T1 or T2 depending on the weather without the physicians ﬁnding out what the weather is except possibly by
retrospective inference from information as to which of these policies was implemented. The important point is that using
data as input can be a way to use data that renders it useful in a decision problem without it being relevant evidence. Because
as evidence, the data are irrelevant, as evidence they are useless. Using the data as input does not make the data relevant
to the patient’s asthmatic condition. It does increase the range of options available to the decision maker. One might pay a
fee for the opportunity to use data as input in this way.
This is the lesson to be learned from the example offered by Seidenfeld, Schervish and Kadane. And that lesson does
nothing to undermine conﬁrmational convexity.
If this rebuttal of the Seidenfeld, Schervish and Kadane objection is successful, then the case for conﬁrmational convexity
may be summarized as follows:
(1) If X and Y share a common extended value structure but different credal states, the convexity of the consensus credal
state may be justiﬁed by appeal to the consensus value structure that should be convex.
(2) The separability and independent variability of the credal state and extended value structure argue for the convexity of
the credal state when the extended value structure is modiﬁed.
(3) Similar arguments support the convexity of the extended value structure.
(4) The cross product rule may then be used to derive probability–utility pairs and the set of permissible expected utilities
used to determine E-admissible options.
Seidenfeld, Schervish and Kadane have sought to undermine this model for a normative theory of rational choice by call-
ing into question the consensus invoked in step (1) (and the analogous consensus appropriate for extended value structures).
They have also challenged the cross product rule referenced in step (4).
Lurking behind this dispute is a disagreement concerning what the objective of an account of indeterminacy in probabil-
ity judgment, value judgment and choice should be. Should we begin our analysis with an investigation of preference over
a value structure characterized by a strict partial order or sets of permissible probability pairs as Kadane, Schervish and
Seidenfeld wish to do [31,33]? Alternatively do we seek an account of conditions under which changes in point of view are
justiﬁed that allows for states of full belief, conﬁrmational commitments and value commitments to change independently
of one another in a manner from which changes in value structure (and, hence, E-admissibility) may be derived?
The view of the Carnegie Mellon trio is more permissive in allowing for violations of convexity. We should not, however,
be so permissive as to allow rational agents to rule out of consideration points of view that ought to be entertained by open
minded inquirers. I think that allowing for violations of convexity is inimical to open – mindedness. Seidenfeld, Schervish
and Kadane disagree.
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